

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W

----- 034263

R 080628Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4401

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

USDEL USSCC GENEVA

MBFR VIENNA 42

DIA WASHDC

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

CINCPAC

CINCEUR

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 16972

CINCPAC FOR POLAD; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; CINCUSAREUR FOR POLAD;
CINCUSNAVEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US

SUBJ: USA JOURNAL COMMENTARY ON SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE

REF: MOSCOW'S A-385; B. MOSCOW 1105

1. SUMMARY. THE NOVEMBER ISSUE OF THE USA INSTITUTE JOURNAL CARRIES AS ITS LEAD ARTICLE A PIECE BY M.A. MIL'SHTEIN AND L.S. SEMEJKO ENTITLED "THE PROBLEM OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT." THE AUTHORS, TWO OF THE INSTITUTE'S MORE PROMINENT COMMENTATORS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES, USE THE ARTICLE AS A VEHICLE TO REPEATEDLY ATTACK THE SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE. THEIR CRITICISM IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT TWO ALLEGED ATTRIBUTES OF THE DOCTRINE: (1) ITS
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ATTEMPT TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS "USABLE" AND (2) ITS

REQUIREMENT FOR QUALITATIVE INCREASES IN THE CAPABILITY OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, WHICH FUELS THE FIRES OF THE ARMS RACE. THE ARTICLE ECHOES COMMENTS MADE IN THE PAST IN PRIVATE TO EMBOFFS BY THE AUTHORS (REFTEL) AND THOSE MADE DURING A RECENT JOINT SYMPOSIUM WITH VISITING U.S. STRATEGIC SCHOLARS (REFAIR). IT NEVERTHELESS CONSTITUTES THE MOST DETAILED PUBLIC ATTACK ON THE SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE TO APPEAR IN SOVIET PRINT TO DATE. END SUMMARY

2. THE ATHE AUTHORS LEAD THEIR READERS THROUGH AN EXPOSITION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC THEORY, FROM MASSIVE RETALIATION IN THE 1950'S TO "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" IN THE 1960'S. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF DETERRENCE TOOK PLACE DURING THE LATTER PERIOD, AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE "SPLENDID FLOWERING" OF THE IDEA OF "ASSURED DESTRUCTION." U.S. STRATEGISTS REALIZED, HOWEVER, THAT "ASSURED DESTRUCTION" WOULD STILL LEAVE THE U.S. OPEN TO CRUSHING BLOWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, SO OTHER CONCEPTS WERE CONSIDERED. ONE ALTERNATIVE WAS THE IDEA OF CITY-AVOIDANCE, THE AIM OF WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY THAT OF DAMAGE LIMITATION. UNDER THE CITY-AVOIDANCE THEORY, AMERICAN STRATEGISTS DISCUSSED TWO VARIATIONS, "LIMITED STRATEGIC WAR" AND "CONTROLLED COUNTERFORCE WAR", BOTH OF WHICH WOULD BE WAGED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC TARGETS. THE FORMER COULD BE USED TO BREAK AN OPPONENT'S WILL TO FIGHT, AND IN THE LATTER THE REAL GOAL WAS THE EXCHANGE OF COUNTERFORCE BLOWS, WHICH, EXPLOITING THE U.S. SUPERIORITY IN NUMBER OF WEAPONS, WOULD LEAVE THE USSR WITH LESS THAN SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF WEAPONS TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST IMPOSITION OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THUS, ENITHER VARIANT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE HUMANITARIAN ENDS THEY WERE ALLEGED TO SERVE.

3. BY THE LATE 1960'S, THESE SUB-ALTERNATIVES HAD LOST IMPORTANCE, AND ASSURED DESTRUCTION BECAME THE BASIC STRATEGIC THEORY FOR THE U.S. THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, HOWEVER, FROM THE 1940'S TO THE 1960'S, THE U.S. WAS ENGAGED IN A SEARCH FOR WAYS TO MAKE ATOMIC WEAPONS "USABLE." ONLY AFTER A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE

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SOVIET-AMERICAN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC BALANCE DID THE POLITICAL REALISM BEGIN TO PREDOMINATE IN THE U.S. WHICH ALLOWED THE SIGNATURE OF THE PNW. (COMMENT: THE AUTHORS HERE IMPLY RATHER DIRECTLY THAT THE PNW PROHIBITS USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, DISTORTING THE LETTER AND INTENT OF THE TREATY. AN EVEN STRONGER IMPLICATION IS MADE LATER IN THE ARTICLE; SEE PARAGRAPH 6. BELOW)

4. NEVERTHELESS, THE STRUGGLE STILL CONTINUES IN THE U.S. ON THE PROCESS OF ACCOMMODATION TO THESE CHANGES. THOUGH SOME INFLUENTIAL CIRCLES SUPPORT, SOME CIRCLES ARE AGAINST THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR. THIS IS ESPECIALLY APPARENT IN THE PROBLEM OF THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. EFFORTS WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN MILITARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE STILL BEING MADE TO FIND WAYS TO EXPAND THE SPECTRUM OF THE "USABILITY" OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. NOW, MOREOVER, AN EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO LEGITIMIZE LIMITED STRIKES AT TARGETS ON THE NATIONAL TERRITORIES OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. THE PENTAGON IS TRYING IN ALL OF THIS TO SHOW THAT SUCH DOCTRINES ARE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE, GIVEN THE CREATION OF HIGHLY ACCURATE WARHEADS. SCHLESINGER IS REQUESTING SUCH A "MODERNIZATION" OF WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE WAGING OF A LIMITED STRATEGIC WAR BY THE U.S.

5. "THE WHEEL IS THUS COMING FULL CIRCLE... SCHLESINGER CONTENTS THAT READINESS TO WAGE WAR THROUGHOUT THE SPECTRUM SHOULD INCREASE RESTRAINT. BUT IN THIS CONTEXT, PRESENT AMERICAN THOUGHT IS NOT ORIGINAL, FOR IT RECONSTRUCTS THE LOGICAL STRUCTURES OF A PAST TIME, STRUCTURES WHICH WERE OVERTURNED A DECADE AGO."

6. THE AUTHORS CONTEND THAT THE UNREALITY AND DANGER OF THE NEW PENTAGON "STRATEGY OF TARGETING" ARE OBVIOUS. THE EVER-PRESENT DANGER OF ESCALATION, THE DIFFICULTY OF LIMITING DAMAGE TO MILITARY TARGETS ONLY, ARE CLEAR. MANY AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN STRATEGISTS ENTERTAIN SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE STRATEGY. IN ADDITION, THIS SEARCH FOR WAYS TO USE ATOMIC WEAPONS "CONTRADICTS IN PRINCIPLE THE IDEA OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ATOMIC WAR, WHICH HAS ALREADY TAKEN THE FORM OF CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS IN CONFIDENTIAL

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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE PNW."

7. THE PENTAGON'S CONCEPTS ALSO CONTRADICT EFFORTS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE PENTAGON USES THEM TO CALL FOR INCREASES IN U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES. "IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE NUCLEAR FORCES CAPABLE OF INFLICTING EFFECTIVE STRIKES ON 'MILITARY TARGETS' CAN SERVE ONLY TO GIVE FURTHER IMPETUS TO THE ARMS RACE." THE AUTHORS THEN ADDUCE A U.S. RATIONALE FOR MIRV'S AND OTHER QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS: "MILITARY TARGETS ADDED TO THE NUMBER OF PRIMARY TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS JUSTIFIES THE DEMAND FOR A GREATER NUMBER OF WARHEADS.... ALSO, HITTING SMALL MILITARY TARGETS UNAVOIDABLY DEMANDS THE CREATION OF HIGHLY ACCURATE MEANS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK, THAT IS, THEIR

CONTINUED QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENT. AND THAT ISM NOTHING OTHER THAN THE ARMS RACE IN ITS MOST COMPLEX, AND PERHAPS MOST DANGEROUS ASPECT -- THE QUALITATIVE."

8. "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE FURTHER PERFECTION OF BASIC ROCKET-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, ESPECIALLY BY INCREASING THE NUMBER AND POWER OF INDIVIDUAL WARHEADS IN COMBINATION WITH AN INCREASE IN THEIR ACCURACY, COULD CALL FORTH THE FEAR THAT WHAT IS OCCURING ARE ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE THE CAPABILITY FOR A MASSIVE COUNTERFORCE AND TO SOME DEGREE DISARMING STRIKE. AND EVEN BEFORE ACTUAL ACQUISITION OF SUCH A CAPABILITY, IT WILL CALL FORTH A CORRESPONDING REACTION, GIVING A NEW IMPULSE TO THE ARMS RACE, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE FACT THAT SUCH A DIRECTION IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION WILL GIVE BIRTH TO NEW SUSPICIONS CONCERNING THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE."
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESS COMMENTS, MILITARY POLICIES, ICBM, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, JOURNALISTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MOSCOW16972
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740321-0920
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741159/aaaabydk.tel
Line Count: 187
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: MOSCOW'S A-385; B. MOSCOW 1105
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 MAR 2002 by morefirh>; APPROVED <24 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: USA JOURNAL COMMENTARY ON SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US, (MIL'SHEIN, M A)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005